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WHERE DO THEY FIT? FRACTIONAL OWNERSHIP
PROGRAMS WEDGED INTO CURRENT AIR LAW
DECISIONS AND GUIDELINES
KRISTEN A. BELL*
T HE INCREASED NEED for businesses to engage in a global
community over the past several decades has led companies
to search for access to safe and affordable air travel. Some have
chosen to purchase their own fleet of aircraft because whole
ownership of private aircraft can allow a business entity to enjoy
flexibility and control. The cost and burden of wholly-owning
aircraft, providing for all management services related to operat-
ing aircraft, and undertaking any liability associated with the air-
craft, however, can make this an undesirable choice for many
businesses. Other companies have chosen to charter aircraft on
an as-needed basis. Although this approach decreases much of
the cost and unnecessary risk of wholly-owned aircraft, compa-
nies lose a great deal of flexibility and control when chartering
flights. Thus, a few visionaries in the aircraft industry have of-
fered a middle ground since the 1980s1 to provide these compa-
nies with the best of both worlds-the flexibility and control of
wholly-owned aircraft with the ability to share costs and opera-
tional burdens with other owners. Now, through the shared
ownership of the aircraft and the help of a management com-
pany to maintain the fleet and organize flights among members,
these companies can enjoy the benefits of private aircraft with-
out flying solo.
* Kristen Bell is a J.D. candidate for the class of 2005 at Southern Methodist
University Dedman School of Law. She would like to thank the International
Aviation Women's Association for their support of women in the study and
promotion of aviation law. She would also like to thank her parents and
husband, Philip Bell, for their encouragement, patience and friendship.
I For a thorough explanation of the rise of fractional ownership programs, see
Eileen M. Gleimer, Where Less Can Be More: Fractional Ownership Programs: The
Wings of the Future, 64J. AIR L. & COM. 979 (1999).
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Part I of this paper will define fractional ownership programs
and explain the responsibilities of fractional owners and man-
agement companies within a traditional program. Part II will dis-
cuss recent legal decisions concerning these programs and
introduce the inconsistencies inherent in these decisions. Part
III will address the effect these decisions may have on develop-
ing law in this area. Parts IV and V will recommend the adop-
tion of certain legal principles to unify the law regarding
fractional ownership programs in order to achieve coherent and




The Netjets program was the first attempt at this new ap-
proach to air travel and introduced the business community to
fractional ownership programs. 2 Programs such as Netjets, cre-
ated by Executive Jet International ("EJI") 3 allow corporate ex-
ecutives private access to travel without paying for their own
aircraft. Fractional ownership programs are defined as
[M]ulti-year programs covering a pool of aircraft each of which is
owned by more than one part and all of which are placed in a dry
lease exchange pool to be made available to any program partici-
pant when the aircraft in which such participant owns an interest
is not available.4
Netjets and similar fractional ownership programs act as man-
agement companies to orchestrate group ownership programs,
allowing affluent individuals or corporate entities to enjoy the
convenience of owning personal aircraft without the cost and
responsibility of doing it alone. Similar to timeshare member-
ships, the owners each "own" a portion of the fleet with contrac-
tual rights to share and use all aircraft in the fleet. In turn,
Netjets manages the fleet by maintaining the aircraft, providing
onboard services, and managing contractual agreements among
the parties. It is important to understand the roles of both the
2 See Regulation of Fractional Aircraft Ownership Programs and On-Demand
Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,520 (Jul. 19, 2001) [hereinafter "Proposed Rules"]
("As of early 2000, the leading fractional ownership programs managed approxi-
mately 465 aircraft on behalf of 3,446 shareowners.").
3 See Troy A. Rolf, The Coming of Age of Fractional Aircraft Ownership Programs, 15
SPG AR & SPACE LAw 11, 11 (2001) ("The original Netjets program [is] consid-
ered to be the traditional fractional ownership model.").
4 Gleimer, supra note 1, at 980-81.
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managing company and the fractional owners in determining
who has operational control of the aircraft and whether the
companies providing management services should be consid-
ered "common carriers" under the law.
A. CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OF THE FRACTIONAL OWNER5
The management company requires each owner to sign a se-
ries of contracts that outline the owner's responsibilities in re-
gard to operation of the aircraft and participation in the
program. To become part of the program, a fractional owner
must agree to share his portion of flight time with others in the
program in exchange for the opportunity to use others' portion
of flight time when necessary.6 First, the fractional owner must
sign a Purchasing Agreement that transfers the specified interest
in the aircraft to the fractional owner. In addition, the owner
agrees not to transfer or sell ownership rights without express
permission from the managing company.' Secondly, the frac-
tional owner enters into a series of other agreements-an Own-
ers Agreement, a Master Interchange Agreement, and a
Management Agreement.8 Most Management Agreements con-
tain a provision that vests operational control in the fractional
owner, not the program manager.' In addition, the owners
agree to be severally liable for the costs of operating the aircraft
and the owners sign a "lease" that allows each owner to use an-
other's aircraft on an as-needed basis. 10
5 The contract outlined is from the "Netjets" program.
6 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1465 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
7 Id.
8 Id. Both the Owners Agreement and Master Interchange Agreement allow
the sharing of fractional interests among other owners of the aircraft. The par-
ties owning an interest in the aircraft were described as "tenants in-common of a
chattel." Id.
9 Rolf, supra note 3, at 12 ("[T]he person or company that has operational
control is legally the operator of the aircraft and hence may bear ultimate respon-
sibility for all operations of the aircraft .... customers of traditional fractional
programs are considered aircraft operators, not passive passengers, and the frac-
tional program in this context is not an aircraft operator but rather a contractor
employed for the purpose of assisting the customer in the operation of the
aircraft.").
lo Id. at 13-15.
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B. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MANAGEMENT COMPANY
By entering into a Management Agreement with fractional
owners, the management company agrees to maintain and make
necessary repairs to the exterior and interior of the aircraft in
compliance with FAA regulations.11 In addition, the manage-
ment company agrees to keep records and logs of flights as re-
quired by the FAA; to pay for the fuel, salary and travel of flight
crews; to pay expenses associated with storing, landing and fly-
ing the aircraft; and to obtain liability insurance for operation of
the aircraft.12 The company coordinates flights between owners
in compliance with the Interchange Agreement"3 and may be
responsible for making federal tax payments. 4 Fractional own-
ers pay the management company a monthly maintenance fee
for the program manager to carry out these services. 5
II. LEGAL DECISIONS CONCERNING FRACTIONAL
OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
Because fractional ownership programs lie somewhere be-
tween private owners and commercial carriers, finding their
place in the body of aviation law has been a challenge. A survey
of administrative decisions and case law discussing fractional
ownership programs show that the controversy is far from over.
Two issues lie at the heart of the legal battle: 1) who is in opera-
tional control of the aircraft, and 2) if the management com-
pany is in operational control, is the company in the business of
"transporting for hire. ' 16 The distinction between commercial
and non-commercial flight operations affect safety regulations,
tax responsibilities, and employee guidelines. In recent years
courts have also extended "common carrier" status to numerous
flight-related entities. Although the analysis hinges on one is-
sue, operational control of the aircraft, the conflicting legal de-
cisions reveal the difficulty inherent in defining these programs
through the standards currently available in aviation law.
11 Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1465-66.
12 Id. at 1466.
13 Rolf, supra note 3, at 14.
14 Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1468-69.
15 Rolf, supra note 3, at 14.
16 See, e.g., Proposed Rules, supra note 2; Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d 1463;
Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Int'l, 328 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2003).
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A. PART 91 OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS
The Federal Aviation Regulations ("FAR") consist of several
tiers of safety regulation. The provisions relevant to our discus-
sion are Part 91, for private owners, and Part 135, for "common
carriers."'17 Fractional ownership programs have generally oper-
ated under Part 91 of the FAR, i  allowing these programs to en-
joy less stringent safety standards and regulations. Part 135 of
the FAR restricts the type of airport available for use,'9 directs
the use of flight crews, 2° and regulates both the "exterior and
interior of the aircraft."'
1. The Business Airline Industry
Not only are fractional ownership programs affected by the
current instability in the law, but other providers of executive air
travel will benefit from unification of the law regarding frac-
tional ownership programs. In-house flight departments, non-
fractional management companies, and charter services com-
pete with fractional ownership programs, and they recognize
the opportunity they have to become a more appealing alterna-
tive to fractional ownership programs if more stringent restric-
tions and costs are placed on fractional ownership programs.
Before the FAA made its decision regarding the safety regula-
tions for fractional ownership programs, several trade organiza-
tions for the air service competitors presented
recommendations to the committee.22 Afraid that a decision to
17 Proposed Rules, supra note 2. According to the proposed rules, the distinc-
tion between Part 91 and Part 135 is who bears the responsibility for "the opera-
tion of the aircraft aboard which [the passengers] are flown." Id. Part 91
regulations, the less stringent of the two, are used when the passenger aboard
owns or leases the aircraft, and therefore, "exercise[s] full control over and
bear[s] full responsibility for the airworthiness and operation" of the aircraft. Id.
18 Id. A regional determination that fractional programs operate under Part 91
has been controlling for several years. Id.
19 Gleimer, supra note 1, at 1003. These include length requirements for run-
way landings, weather reporting facilities, and visibility minimums not required
for Part 91 flights. Id.
20 Id. at 1003-04. Those flights regulated under Part 135 of the FAR are limited
in the "number of hours that a crew member may fly ... and the number of
hours that a pilot may be on duty." Id. Furthermore, companies operating
under Part 135 have more restrictions on the "hiring and retention of personnel"
than companies operating under Part 91. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1029; for the official text of the proceedings, see Regulation of Frac-
tional Aircraft Ownership Programs and On-Demand Operations, 68 Fed. Reg.
54,520 (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter "Regulation"].
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place fractional ownership programs under Part 135 restrictions
would lead to stronger restrictions for other similar providers,
some competitors to fractional ownership programs stepped for-
ward to distinguish themselves from these programs and to en-
courage the FAA to maintain its current level of restrictions over
fractional ownership programs.21 Other programs, such as char-
ter services, regulated under Part 135 of the FAR, were eager to
use the evaluation of safety regulations regarding fractional
ownership programs to endorse an "industry-wide self-regulating
initiative" to allow all companies serving business aviation needs
the ability to operate under Part 91 of the FAR.24
Despite their self-interested involvement in the FAA, several
organizations proposed a set of guidelines outlining a persuasive
solution to the concerns plaguing administrative and judicial de-
cisions regarding fractional ownership programs.25 Most impor-
tantly, these guidelines propose specific measures to address an
important problem with fractional ownership programs-defin-
ing who has operational control.2 6 Although the parties sign a
contract stating that the fractional owner has operational con-
trol of the aircraft, the responsibility that comes with opera-
tional control under the FAA regulations can be lost between
the owner and the program manager. The proposed guidelines
addressed this concern by imposing a requirement upon pro-
gram managers to "brief the fractional owner on operational
control responsibilities," forcing owners to sign an "acknowledge-
ment of the Fractional Owner's Operational Control Responsibilities"
upon transfer of title, and specifying instances where the pro-
gram manager, not the fractional owner would be in opera-
23 Id. at 1017.
24 Id. at 1018-1020. The National Air Transportation Association ("NATA")
represented air charter companies. They suggested that "fractional ownership
programs, particularly the extensive interchange feature, constituted a new form
of air transportation and should be regulated under Part 135, rather than Part
91. Months later, the board opted to endorse an initiative that would "define
fractional ownership and develop safety guidelines" and "at the same time ...
remove some of the archaic regulations burdening Part 135 regulation." Id.
25 Id. at 1022.
26 Id. at 1016-1017. Although fractional owners agree that they are in 'opera-
tional control' of the aircraft they purchase, the aviation industry and the FAA
are still concerned that the fractional owners are not informed enough to safely
control the aircraft. The Shared Aircraft Committee, however, pointed out that
the parties to a fractional ownership contract are "sophisticated business people"
and are aware of the importance of the documents they are signing. Id.
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tional control of the aircraft.27 If the fractional owner or
program manager fail to meet the FAA guidelines, the FAA has
the right to determine the program manager is in operational
control and hold them to Part 135 safety regulations. 21
2. FAA Response
Recently, the FAA engaged in a thorough investigation of
fractional ownership programs to determine whether they
should continue to operate under Part 91 of the FAR, or be
deemed commercial carriers subject to Part 135 of the regula-
tions. Although the Federal Rules Committee expressed con-
cern about the growth of fractional ownership programs and
their status as non-commercial carriers, it refused to hold frac-
tional ownership programs subject to Part 135 regulations. 29 In-
stead, the Committee proposed a new subpart to 91, making it
clear that the distinction between Part 91 and Part 135 is
whether the aircraft is being used for a commercial purpose. °
Through this clarification, the FAA has clearly kept arrange-
ments such as "time-sharing arrangements, interchange agree-
ments, and joint ownership arrangements" under the less
stringent guidelines of Part 91.31 By determining that fractional
owners "share more of their regulatory characteristics with the
owners of non-commercially operated aircraft than with passen-
gers using on-demand operators," the Committee was able to
permit fractional ownership programs to remain under less
stringent regulations. 2
The Committee, however, recognized some differences be-
tween whole owners and fractional owners;33 therefore, it pro-
posed Subpart (k) to apply exclusively to these programs.
27 Id. at 1023-1025 (emphasis added) ("Specifically, the owner does not have
operational control when the aircraft being used is not a program aircraft. A
program aircraft is used for administrative purposes ... and when no passengers
or property designated by an owner are being carried or when the aircraft being
used for the flight is chartered and is being operated under Part 135.
28 Id. at 1025.
29 See Proposed Rules, supra note 2.
30 Id. Under Subpart (4), a person is allowed "to operate his or her aircraft 'for
his personal transportation, or the transportation of his guests when no charge,
assessment or fee is made for the transportation."' Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. ("Fractional owners differ from a majority of whole business or personal
aircraft owners in that (1) fractionally-owned aircraft typically have multiple own-
ers, (2) their aircraft's availability is a component of a pooled fleet under a dry
lease exchange program .... (3) the owners ... agree to use the services of a
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Subpart (k) outlines the safety standards of fractional ownership
programs and the obligations of the managing company to en-
sure the "airworthiness and operation of fractional ownership
program aircraft." 4 Through its adoption of the heightened
regulations found in Subpart (k) of Part 91, the FAA has at-
tempted to clarify its position. Although these programs warrant
special regulation and attention, they should not be subjected to
the stringent standards for commercial aircraft operating under
Part 135 of the FAA regulations.
By adopting Subpart (k) for fractional ownership programs,
the FAA has adopted some of the industry's suggestions.3 5 Al-
though the FAA has not opted to relieve charter services of Part
135 regulations, 6 it did choose to heighten the standards for
these programs so that the safety threats arising from fractional
owners having operational control may be diminished. The new
provisions require managers to fully train all pilots and crew,
maintain more complete records, and implement safer in-flight
operations. 7 In addition, the roles of the fractional owner and
program manager have been clearly defined by the FAA Subpart
(k) proposal to increase responsibility and safe flight opera-
tions.3 ' Finally, the rules would "provide for the joint and sev-
single company to manage their aircraft, and (4) all owners agree to a uniform
aircraft configuration.").
34 Id. It is important to note that management companies may also provide on-
demand charter services. This service would still be regulated under Part 135 of
the FAR.
35 14 C.F.R. § 91.1001. According to Subpart 91.1001(5),
A fractional ownership program . . . means any system of aircraft
ownership and exchange that consists of all of the following ele-
ments: (i) The provision for fractional ownership program manage-
ment services by a single fractional ownership program manager on
behalf of fractional owners; (ii) two or more airworthy aircraft; (iii)
one or more fractional owners per program aircraft, with at least
one program aircraft having more than one owner; (iv) possession
of at least a minimum fractional ownership interest in one or more
program aircraft by each fractional owner; (v) a dry-lease aircraft
exchange agreement among all of the fractional owners; and (vi)
multi-year program agreements covering the fractional ownership,
fractional ownership programs, and dry-lease exchange aspects of
the program.
Id.
36 Eileen M. Gleimer, The Regulation of Fractional Ownership: Have the Wings of the
Future Been Clipped?, 67J. AIR L. & COM. 321, 357-58 (2002).
37 Id. at 360-61; see also Regulation, supra note 22.
38 Gleimer, supra note 36, at 368 ("[T]he contract manager must include pro-
visions to ensure that the owner has the right to inspect and to conduct audits of
the program manager, that the program manager has the obligation to ensure
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eral responsibility of the owner and program manager for the
safe operation of the flight and for compliance with the FARs." 9
Although fractional ownership programs still need time to
adopt and implement the new provisions in Subpart (k), stabil-
ity in this area of the law allows program managers and partici-
pants to adjust program operations so that they are compliant
with FAA regulations.
B. TAx RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FRACTIONAL
OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
1. Federal Excise Tax
In 1997, the Federal Circuit was asked to determine whether a
fractional ownership program, Executive Jet Aviation ("EJA"),4 °
overpaid taxes under the IRC; the important determination lay
in whether EJA was a commercial or noncommercial carrier
through operation of the "Netjets" program. 41 In 1970, Con-
gress enacted the Airport and Airway Revenue Act ("AARA"),
which made a distinction between commercial and non-com-
mercial flights in determining payment of taxes. 42 Non-com-
mercial flights were only required to pay gasoline and
nongasoline fuel taxes. Commercial flights, on the other hand,
were subjected to an air transportation tax determined by a
"percentage of the fee charged for the transportation."4 The
Internal Revenue Code defines "noncommercial aviation" as
"any use of an aircraft, other than the use in a business of trans-
porting persons or property for compensation or hire by air. 44
To determine whether "the use of an aircraft" should be taxed
under the AARA, the IRS uses the "'possession, command, and
that the program complies with the requirements of Subpart (k) and that the
owner will be advised when aircraft outside of the program are going to be used.
Subpart (k) also requires that each owner be briefed on its responsibilities and
potential liability and that it sign an acknowledgement of such matters .... ").
39 Id. at 369. Accordingly, the FAA is confident that the "regulation of frac-
tional ownership programs under Subpart (k) will provide an appropriate level of
safety for these kinds of operations .... " Id.
4o EJA and EJI are sister companies, owned by the same parent and providing
similar services. Both operate some form of the "Netjets" program.
41 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1464 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
42 Id. At 1454; Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 (1970).
43 Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1464-65.
44 26 U.S.C. §4041 (c) (2004); see also id. at 1465; Philip E. Crowther, Taxation of
Fractional Programs: "Flying Over Unchartered Waters" 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 241, 254-55
(2002) (" [T] he IRS has consistently used the 'possession, command and control'
test to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial operators.").
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control' test."45 In the past, the IRS has used the FAA's "concept
of 'operational control"' to determine "who has 'possession,
command, and control' of the aircraft. '46 In its independent
investigation of fractional ownership programs, the IRS deter-
mined that "although the owners are the title owners to the air-
craft, they have relinquished possession, command and control,
of their respective aircraft to the taxpayer who provides air trans-
portation. 47 This holding is clearly in conflict with the FAA's
latest decision to assume operational control of the aircraft in
the fractional owner.
The courts have supported the IRS's determination that the
private owners have relinquished "possession, control and com-
mand" and therefore held that the management company is
subject to the federal AARA tax for commercial flights. In Execu-
tive Jet Aviation, Texaco Air, a subsidiary of Texaco, Inc., was a
member in the Netjets program with an undivided one-half in-
terest in a Cessna aircraft.48 For the Cessna flights, EJA paid the
IRS fuel taxes under Section 4041 (c) of the IRC as a noncom-
mercial carrier. The IRS, however, determined that EJA was
providing commercial transportation subject to the air transpor-
tation tax under IRC Section 4261 .4 Through an analysis of the
statute and the contractual agreement between EJA and Texaco
as fractional owner, the Federal Circuit refused to accept EJA's
argument that it was merely an aircraft manager.5 ° Instead, the
court found that EJA was in the "business of transporting per-
sons or property for compensation or hire by air . . -51 By
45 Crowther, supra note 44, at 253-54.
46 Id. at 254 (citing Tech. Adv. Mems. 93-47-007 (Aug. 12, 1993) and 94-04-007
(Oct. 20, 1993)). Although some distinctions can be made between the owners'
relationship to the management company, similarities exist between the entities
discussed in these decisions and fractional ownership programs. In determining
that the owner retained control in Tech. Adv. Mem. 9347-007, the court con-
cluded that the management company was merely an agency of the federal agent,
not an "independent contractor," because "'the totality of the contract provi-
sions, particularly those whereby [the owner] pays the operational expenses, re-
tains and exercises substantial operational control and assumes the risk of loss
indicate that the [management company] is merely acting as an agent of [the
owner]."' Id.
47 Crowther, supra note 44, at 264-65 (discussing the decision of Tech. Adv.
Mem. 93-14-002, which compares fractional ownership programs that align more
closely with charter operations, or "wet-lease exchange programs").
48 Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1466-67.
4q Id. at 1467.
50 Id. at 1468.
51 Id. at 1468-69; see also Crowther, supra note 44, at 273 (" [C]ourts interpret-
ing this language [have] uniformly held that, in order for a company to be en-
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upholding summary judgment for the IRS, the court agreed that
there were "negligible differences between the Netjets aircraft
interchange program and the operation of a commercial air
charter business. 52
One legal scholar notes an important inconsistency, though,
in the analysis of the IRS and the analysis of the Federal Circuit
in determining whether EJA should be subject to the federal ex-
cise tax.53 Interestingly, the IRS focused its decision on who had
"possession, control and command" of the aircraft. The Federal
Circuit, however, came to the same conclusion through differ-
ent means-by holding that the program "was engaged in the
'business of transporting persons or property for hire by air.' 54
It is arguable that the Federal Circuit's determination relied on
the IRS's initial finding that the program manager retained con-
trol. A comparison of the decision makers' rationales, however,
is an important example of the strong connection that exists be-
tween operational control and commercial carriage. If deci-
sions are made without recognizing the relationship between
these two concepts, illogical conclusions result that send a con-
flicting message to both program participants and the aviation
community as a whole.
2. Income Tax
The above decisions, when compared to income tax provi-
sions designed to allow an aircraft owner deductions for depre-
ciation of the aircraft from his annual income tax return,
highlight the consequences of unsettled law in this area.55 In
Executive Jet Aviation, the court determined that the program
manager would be required to pay federal excise taxes for use of
the aircraft. Income tax laws, however, have treated 'joint
owner[s] of property as the tax owner of their share of the prop-
erty, '56 and there is no indication in case law or administrative
discussion that this practice will, or should, change. 57 Some logi-
gaged in the transportation business, the company must provide not only the
operators but also the equipment.").
52 Id. at 1469.
53 Crowther, supra note 44, at 270.
54 Id.
5 For a full discussion of the impact of the IRS determination on income tax
laws, see id. at 279-87.
56 Id. at 282.
57 Id. at 283-85 ("As long as the interest owner has the risk of loss of value on
the resale of the aircraft, the tax owner should be considered the tax owner of
2004]
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cal problems are present, however, with these opposing obliga-
tions to pay federal taxes. In one instance, the IRS and courts
have held that, although the owners technically own the aircraft,
the program manager is in control of the aircraft's use, and thus
subject to federal excise taxes. On the other hand, the current
law concerning income tax on property allows the fractional
owners to deduct depreciation of the aircraft from their income
tax filings. If the program managers are unable to elicit funds
paid for the excise tax from the fractional owners, an unfair re-
sult may occur as the program manager pays taxes for the air-
craft's use but is unable to deduct any depreciation resulting
from that use on its annual payment of federal income tax.
3. State Tax Laws
In addition to the excise tax imposed by the federal govern-
ment on program managers, fractional owners may also be
forced to pay state sales, use and property taxes.58 In Fall Creek
Construction Company v. Director of Revenue, the Supreme Court of
Missouri was asked to decide whether fractional owners were re-
sponsible for payment of use taxes on aircraft in which they
owned a fractional interest.59 The court meeting en banc relied
on several factors to determine that the fractional interest in the
aircraft was tangible personal property, and therefore, the frac-
tional owner was subject to the use tax under Missouri law.6"
First, the purchasing agreement between the management com-
pany and the fractional owner was unambiguous in defining the
transfer of interest in the aircraft as a sale of property.61 Second,
the court looked to the FAA's determination that the owner, not
the management company, was in "operational control" of the
aircraft.6 2 Finally, although the aircraft was stored outside of the
state and most of its flights occurred outside of the state, the
the aircraft and should be entitled to claim the depreciation deduction on the
aircraft.").
58 Janine Cook & Alysse Grossman, Entering the Private Air Travel Market: Upfront
Tax Planning Can Minimize A Bumpy Ride, 99 J. TAX'N. 201, 208 (2003) ("Sales and
use tax concerns also may arise for taxpayers purchasing a fractional interest in
an aircraft. Missouri has taken the position that the purchase of a fractional
share is a taxable purchase, while New York and Texas have taken the opposite
position." Property taxes are generally "imposed by the state or locality where the
aircraft is hangared.").
59 109 S.W.3d 165, 167 (Mo. 2003).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 170.
62 Id.
438
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court still found a reasonable nexus between the state and the
property to hold the fractional owner responsible for use taxes
in Missouri.6 3
Some states have come to the opposite conclusion. In Texas,
the Office of the Comptroller sent out a declaration that the
program manager is "responsible for any tax on the purchase of
the airplane. 64 The New York Commissioner of Taxation and
Finance came to a similar conclusion-that "a fractional pro-
gram is a non-taxable transportation service."65 Like the Texas
Comptroller's Office, the New York Commissioner determined
that aircraft in a fractional ownership program is not "really
sold" to the fractional owner.66 Again, the main issue in each
case depends on who is in operational control of the aircraft, yet
different decisions on the same question result in confusing pre-
cedent in case law. Unfortunately, because very few states have
answered the domestic issue of state taxes for fractional owner-
ship programs, program participants are unable to make fully
informed business decisions regarding involvement in a frac-
tional interest relationship. Because several states have given
opinions on the issue, and the instability of the law raises some
risk to participants, a lack of uniformity on this issue may lead to
forum-shopping by fractional ownership programs looking for a
63 Id. at 171.
64 FYI: Sales Tax, TAX POLICY NEWS (December 2000), at http://www.cpa.state.
tx.us/taxinfo/taxpnw/tpn2000/tpn01201.html. Using the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion regarding the federal excise tax, the Office of the Comptroller determined
that "[a] Ithough the participant provides some direction to the pilots, possession
of the aircraft remains with the seller. In this situation, the participant is con-
tracting for a nontaxable air charter service, and a taxable sale or rental of an
aircraft to a participant does not occur." Id.
65 Crowther, supra note 44, at 308-09 (discussing The Gap, Inc., TSB-A-00(3) S,
Adv. Op. N.Y. Comm'r Tax & Fin. (Jan. 28, 2001)). It should be noted that the
situation in The Gap was slightly different than the Netjets program described
earlier. The program manager performed the same duties but was not the initial
seller of the aircraft. Id.
66 Id. In this ruling, the Commissioner outlines several reasons why there is not
sufficient transfer of control to warrant a retail sale of the aircraft. Some of these
reasons include:
1. The manager arranges for the aircraft to be inspected, main-
tained, serviced ... with respect to appropriate FAA standards and
guidelines; 2. [The] manager maintains all records, logs and other
materials required by the FAA ... ; 3. [The] [m]anager retains the
right to use the aircraft during periods it is not being utilized in the
transportation of . . . other owners.
Id.
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state tax that is economically beneficial to their operational
goals.
C. FRACTIONAL OWNERSHIP PROGRAM EMPLOYEES
One important part of the fractional ownership program that
has not been fully addressed is how the employees of these pro-
grams should be treated. Applicability of union membership,
overtime pay, and flight crew work regulations are all affected by
these decisions. Without uniform laws that clearly define the
nature of the fractional ownership business, employees of these
programs may be hurt by the laws that were designed to protect
them.
1. Unionization of Employees through the National Mediation
Board
The National Mediation Board ("NMB") serves as the federal
agency responsible for administering the Railway Labor Act.67
Through its certification process, common carriers can apply for
union representation through the Board. If approved, the
Board then oversees collective bargaining agreements among
common carriers to verify compliance with the RLA. In 1971,
the Board approved union representation for EJA employees.6"
This certification required the Board to determine that EJA had
"common carrier" status, and the Board's interpretation of the
RLA in this regard is controlling.6 9 Therefore, certification of
EJA under the NMB implies that EJA and similar program man-
agers may be "common carriers" under the RLA.70 Other frac-
tional ownership program employees have yet to become
unionized, however, and therefore are not yet subject to the
NMB interpretation.71
2. Fair Labor Standards Act
Most commercial air carriers are exempt from the overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") through en-
67 Thibodeaux v. Executive jet Int'l, 328 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Thibo-
deaux II"). The Railway Labor Act provides an exemption to the FLSA overtime




70 District 6, Int'l Union of Indus. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd. of the United States,
139 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
71 Id.
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actment of Title II of the Railway Labor Act.7 2 Because these
carriers are "common carriers" by air, the legislature enacted
this exemption to alleviate the possibility of strikes or labor dis-
putes that would obstruct the purpose of the Railway Labor
Act-"to keep transportation moving. 73 In response, many
commercial air carrier employees have protected themselves
from unfair labor practices through union membership. With-
out notice of a company's FLSA exemption, employees may
elect not to unionize because they do not see the benefit of the
added protection that these organizations provide. If a court
later decides that the company for whom the employees work is
exempt under Title II of the RLA, these employees are left with-
out recourse through legal means or collective bargaining.
In Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet International, the Fifth Circuit was
asked to determine whether a non-union fractional ownership
management company, EJI, was a common carrier under the
FLSA.74 Thibodeaux and other similarly-situated flight attend-
ants were forced to work overtime under Part 91 flights in the
Netjets program.7 5 They filed suit against the fractional owner-
ship company, claiming that the FLSA required EJI to pay com-
pensation for overtime.76 The district court refused to grant
summary judgment to EJI because it could not hold as a matter
of law that flight attendants who worked solely on Part 91 flights
were not subject to the FLSA provisions. 77 Furthermore, it did
not determine that EJI was a "common carrier" under Title II of
the RLA and thus subject to FLSA exemptions.7"
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit took a different approach than
the district court's analysis, which focused on the FAA regula-
tions and recent proposal to keep fractional ownership pro-
grams under Part 91 of the regulations. Instead of looking at
these administrative determinations, the court utilized a test it
72 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (3) (2004); Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. § 181.
73 45 U.S.C. § 181.
74 Thibodeaux II, 328 F.3d at 742, 744-745.
75 Id. Although EJI handled Part 91 and Part 135 flights, the flight attendants
that brought suit in this case spent 100% of their time on Part 91 flights. Id.
76 Id.
77 Thibodeux v. Executive jet Int'l, No. Civ. A. 00-3237, 2001 WL 699653 (E.D.
La. June 18, 2001) ("Thibodeux I"). As discussed above, Part 91 regulations are
less stringent than Part 135 regulations and apply to non-commercial carriers. See
supra note 75. The FAA decided that fractional ownership programs fit more
closely within the less stringent guidelines outlined by Part 91 of the FAR.
78 Thibodeaux I, No. Civ. A. 00-3237, 2001 WL 699653.
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created in Woolsey v. National Transportation Board.7 9 In Woolsey,
the Fifth Circuit was asked to determine if a pilot was subject to
Part 135 regulations."0 The court looked to the nature of his
business, Premier Touring, Inc., which contracted with musi-
cians to provide flight transportation."' The court found that
the "crucial determination in assessing the status of a carrier is
whether the carrier has held itself out to the public or to a defin-
able segment of the public as being willing to transport for hire,
indiscriminately."
8 2
The court applied this test to EJI's Netjets program and deter-
mined that EJI was a common carrier as a matter of law."3 Rec-
ognizing that Netjets targeted only a small segment of the
population, the court still found that EJI held itself out indis-
criminately to a definable segment of the public.84 By marketing
through direct mail, in periodicals, and at public events, the
court found that EJI "defined itself through its own marketing
efforts as being willing to carry any member of that segment of
the public which it serves."8 5 EJI, therefore, was defined as a
common carrier as a matter of law, and Thibodeaux was left
without recourse for his unpaid overtime work.
Similarly, in Valdevieso v. Atlas Air Lines, the court refused to
require Atlas Air to pay its employees overtime under the
FLSA. 6 Again, the court utilized the Woolsey test to determine
that a company which owned, operated and maintained a fleet
of freighter aircraft used to transport cargo was a "common car-
rier" under the FLSA exemption. 7 Unpersuaded by the argu-
ment that Atlas Air was not a common carrier because it does
not service the "public at large," the court held that common
carrier status is not determined by the size of the public served,
but whether the company holds itself out to "anyone willing to
accept its terms and prices."8 As employees "integral for the
transportation of cargo," the loadmasters who brought this suit
79 993 F.2d 516, 518 (5th Cir. 1993); Thibodeaux II, 328 F.3d 742.
80 Woolsey, 993 F.2d at 518.
81 Id. at 517.
82 Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
83 Thibodeaux II, 328 F.3d at 752-54. The court also gave significant weight to
the NMB's determination that EJA, EJI's sister company, was a "common carrier"
under the Railway Act as discussed above. Id.
84 Id. at 753.
85 Id.
86 305 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2002).
87 Id. at 1286-87.
88 Id. at 1287.
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were excluded from the overtime protections provided in the
FLSA.8 9
Compared with the determination of the FAA regarding
safety regulations for fractional ownership programs, this deci-
sion seems to be a clear contradiction of the administrative deci-
sion. Although the Fifth Circuit refused to address the question
of operational control as defined by the FAA, it clearly assumed
that the program manager is in control of the aircraft. This as-
sumption led the court to its final holding-that the manager
"indiscriminately holds itself out to the public." If the court had
determined that the owner was in control of the aircraft, and
that the program manager was merely a service provider for the
fractional owners, the conclusion drawn by the court would be
illogical. Fractional owners, who transport employees and cli-
ents, could not be considered commercial carriers through the
court's analysis. Therefore, like the Federal Circuit in the excise
tax decision, the Fifth Circuit first had to find that EJI was in
control of the aircraft and its flight schedule in order to logically
draw the conclusion that EJI was a common carrier under the
law. This logical leap, however, was not a decision without conse-
quences. Thibodeaux and other similarly situated flight attend-
ants were left without pay for overtime work because of the
court's application of FLSA exemptions.
3. Crew Schedules
Under the FAA's proposed additions to Part 91 regulations
for fractional ownership programs, restrictions are also placed
on the amount of work the flight crew may perform. Subpart
(k) imposes stricter flight, duty and rest requirements for the
crew of fractional ownership aircraft.90 For example, when flight
time exceeds ten hours, the new provision will require the crew
to take a rest period equivalent to the total hours on duty.91 Al-
though it is clear that these provisions are aimed at promoting
safe travel among fractional ownership programs, their effect on
the crew employed by the programs should be considered when
making any legal decisions regarding the regulation of frac-
tional ownership programs.
89 Id.
90 Gleimer, supra note 36, at 361-62.
91 Id. Other provisions include more stringent regulation of airport use and
mandatory drug and alcohol testing.
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D. COMPANIES RELATED TO AIR TRAVEL
In a relevant legal discussion, courts have found that several
companies providing services for air travel are also "common
carriers" under the FLSA. In 1934, Congress expanded the Rail-
way Act to include companies that perform "transportation-re-
lated services. ''92  Congress's reasons for expanding the
definition of "carrier" include: "(1) to avoid the possibility that
certain employees could interrupt commerce with a strike, and
(2) to prevent a carrier covered by the RLA from evading the
purpose of the Act by spinning off components of its operation
into subsidiaries and or related companies.""
In District 6, International Union of Industrial v. National Media-
tion Board, the court gave deference to the NMB's determination
of carrier status for an airline caterer because 1) "the nature of
the work [was] that traditionally performed by employees of ...
air carriers," and 2) the employer was "directly or indirectly
owned or controlled by, or under common control with carrier
or carriers."94 Looking at the case law, which exhibits a broad
interpretation for carrier status, the court concluded that air-
catering companies can be common carriers for purposes of the
RLA.95
In Verrett v. The Sabre Group, the court came to a similar con-
clusion, holding that a company providing information technol-
ogy to American Airlines was a common carrier for purposes of
the RLA.6 The Sabre Group was responsible for providing com-
puter systems that organized flight schedules, maintenance
records, reservations, and other information. 7 Again, the court
utilized a two-part test to determine that the Sabre Group was
controlled by a common carrier and engaged in transportation-
related services."
In each case, the court relies on the rationale given by Con-
gress for the RLA to find these affiliates common carriers under
the law. Courts seem eager to extend the FLSA exemption
under the RLA to all but the most tenuous affiliate relationships
because labor disputes among closely related transportation ser-
92 Verrett v. The Sabre Group, 70 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (N.D. Okla. 1999) (cit-
ing 45 U.S.C. § 151).
93 Id.
94 139 F. Supp.2d 557, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
95 Id.
96 70 F. Supp. at 1279.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1281-83.
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vice providers could obstruct commercial travel, and have used
these cases to support extension of common carrier status to
fractional ownership programs. Arguably, these two entities
function quite differently. Extending common carrier status to
affiliates that serve commercial flights directly extends the pur-
pose of the Railway Act exemption, to keep transportation mov-
ing. Because fractional ownership programs service such a small
segment of the population, and have been defined more closely
with whole owner programs than charter programs by the FAA,
it is unclear how an extension of common carrier status will fur-
ther the RLA's purpose. Furthermore, the tension between the
interpretations made by the FAA, NMB and the Fifth Circuit re-
garding fractional ownership programs adds to the confusion
surrounding this unique business and makes an answer to the
role of these programs in the aviation community more difficult
to find.
III. OTHER AREAS OF LAW AFFECTED BY THE
UNCLEAR STATUS OF THESE PROGRAMS
The decisions discussed above pose important difficulties for
the state of the law concerning fractional ownership programs.
The FAA, IRS, and FLSA all purport to make decisions on
whether a fractional ownership program is a commercial, or
"common carrier," under the law. Yet, each entity comes to a
different conclusion. The foundation of their decision lies in
who is in operational control of the aircraft. If the management
company is in 'operational control,' clearly the flights in ques-
tion are commercial. If the owner is in control, however, it is
necessary to find that flights under these programs are non-com-
mercial. In addition to the legal disputes that have already
arisen regarding the nature of fractional ownership programs,
several issues may be just on the horizon.
A. TORT LIABILITY
As a survey of the administrative and case law suggests, there is
a valid question concerning who is responsible for the aircraft in
fractional ownership programs. The FAA's determination that
fractional ownership programs should remain under Part 91 was
based on the assumption that the fractional owner, not the man-
agement company, is in operational control of the aircraft."9
99 Mark A. Dombroff, Liability and the Growth of Fractional Aircraft Ownership Pro-
grams,16 AIR & SPACE LAW 4, 4 (2002) ("According to the FAA, responsibility for
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Some courts, however, have rested their decision on the "com-
mercial" nature of these programs comparing fractional owner-
ship programs to charter programs1°° and finding managers of
these programs "common carriers" under the law. 1 In these
decisions, the program manager fills the role as aircraft opera-
tor, and the fractional owner more closely resembles a passen-
ger, not a property owner.10
2
These competing interpretations over who is really in control
of the aircraft in fractional ownership programs may lead to dis-
putes when questions of tort liability are presented to the courts.
Most contract agreements between the program manager and
fractional owner explicitly vest operational control in the hands
of the individual owner. 10 3 In addition, the FAA has determined
that fractional owners are in operational control of the aircraft.
For purposes of tort liability, however, this can have vast conse-
quences for the fractional owner who also signs an interchange
agreement with other aircraft owners and could be held liable
for the torts committed by his "partners" in this endeavor."0
Currently, the IRS and FLSA decisions suggest that program
managers will likely be held responsible in cases of tort liability
in a court of law. Without a clear decision on the status of these
programs, though, there is a valid possibility that fractional own-
ers investing in these programs could be open for large, unex-
pected liability claims.
B. SECURITIES REGULATION
In addition, fractional ownership programs may be subject to
securities regulations if they are not careful in how they market
and structure their business. One practitioner, Kenneth Krohn,
operational control is in the hands of the individual fractional owners because
they have the requisite capability, . . . and generally speaking are considered the
experts in the operational control of the aircraft .... Any finding of negligence
in the operation of the aircraft would be the responsibility of the fractional
owner-the individual in operational control.").
100 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1465 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
101 Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Int'l, 528 F.3d 742, 744-45 (5th Cir. 2003).
102 Dombroff supra note 99, at 21.
103 Id.
104 Id. ("The interchange agreement executed at the time of purchase often
expressly extends operational control to any aircraft the fractional owner uses
within the interchange pool. Thus, an individual owner is liable for damages
caused by operation of "pool" aircraft. Technically a fractional owner could incur




points out that the question lies in whether fractional ownership
programs are considered security investments under the Howey
test created for implementation of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.105 Under the Howey
Test, a company can be subject to securities regulation if 1)
there is an investment of money; 2) there is a common enter-
prise; and 3) there is an expectation of profits derived solely
from the effort of others. 116 According to Krohn, all of the ele-
ments are met through the practice of fractional ownership pro-
grams except the requirement that there be an expectation of
profits. 107
If "a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume the
item purchased," the securities laws do not apply. 0 The ques-
tion of whether this element is met with regard to fractional
ownership programs lies largely in determining who is in con-
trol of the aircraft and whether this entity is in the "business" of
providing transportation. If the individual owners use their own
interest to provide personal transportation, it is doubtful that
these programs will be held investments under the 1933 and
1934 Acts. 0 9 If, however, the program manager is deemed to be
in the business of transporting individuals for hire, like in the
Thibodeaux and EJA cases,110 it is possible that the fractional own-
ership program and agreements therein could be considered se-
curities under the law.' Until the law is decided on this
105 Kenneth P. Krohn, Fractional Ownership and Timeshare Programs: Are They Sub-
ject to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ?, 54 Bus. LAW.
1181, 1181-82 (1999). Securities regulations protect investors by requiring disclo-
sure of company resources and grant "administrative, civil, and criminal remedies
against those who violate provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Act." Id.
106 Id. at 1192-93 (discussing the holding in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298 (1946)).
107 Id. at 1199-1203.
108 Id. at 1200 (citing United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
852 (1975)).
109 See id. at 1210.
110 Thibodeaux v. Executive jet Int'l, 528 F.3d 742, 754 (5th Cir. 2003); see also
Executive jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
- Krohn, supra note 105, at 1210-12 ("[I]t is possible that certain program
structural and promotional characteristics, when considered in the aggregate,
could rise to a level that causes the predominate attraction of the program to be
financial returns, rather than the use of the aircraft ... the program interests
could be deemed to be securities ... because the interest in the aircraft is subject
to an agreement under which the manager is to provide services to the partici-
pant related to the aircraft ... because the participants must hold the aircraft
available for use by others, must use an exclusive management agreement agent,
and are materially restricted in their occupancy of the aircraft. In addition, there
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subject, programs managers must be careful how they structure
and market their programs to make the intent of the parties
clear. Through an analysis of securities law, Krohn makes sev-
eral recommendations: 1) contract agreements should not allow
the transfer of interests to others;' 12 2) managers should not al-
low individuals owners to sell or transfer "for compensation or
hire their right to use program aircraft";11 3 3) the program
should avoid taking on any appearance of being a "commercial
enterprise";' 14 and 4) promotional efforts should "emphasize
the 'use' aspects [of the program], not any 'profit' aspects"" 5 of
the program.
IV. UNIFICATION OF THE LAW
Clearly, the legal community is divided when deciding where
fractional ownership programs lie in the realm of aviation law.
After a tedious investigation, the FAA has determined that they
are not commercial carriers subject to Part 135 regulations but
should remain under Part 91 of the FAR because they are closer
to whole owners than charter operations. To the contrary, the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of the IRC and inquiry into frac-
tional ownership status imputes tax liability on these programs
as commercial carriers because there is relatively little difference
between a program like Netjets and charter flights. Some state
courts agree and others have decided to hold the owners re-
sponsible for their own share of use taxes, even if used and
stored outside of the state most of the time. The NMB and Fifth
Circuit have determined that fractional ownership programs are
"common carriers" as a matter of law because they "hold them-
selves out indiscriminately to the public" and more closely re-
semble a commercial agent, not a service provider. In the midst
of this discussion is a contract agreement that explicitly places
operational control in the fractional owner. Because of the im-
pact of the conflicting nature of the law, some efforts must be
made to unify the administrative and case law so that fractional
ownership programs and their participants are aware of their
status as air carriers and can make business and legal decisions
accordingly.
are a number of promotional characteristics that contribute to an expectation of
profits.").
112 Id. at 1225.
113 Id. at 1225-26.
114 Id. at 1226.
115 Id. at 1227.
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A. INCREASE SAFETY
Different interpretations regarding the role of program man-
agers and fractional owners creates the potential for safety
hazards and should concern the FAA and program participants.
The FAA's proposed rules allow fractional ownership programs
to remain under Part 91 of the FAR. The less stringent safety
regulations under Part 91 allow these flights more discretion in
the use and hiring of the pilots and crew, the runway length for
airport landings, and the nature of the fractional ownership re-
lationship. 1 6 This decision was made in part based on an un-
derstanding that the individual owners are in operational
control of the aircraft, and thus, more closely resemble whole
aircraft owners.
There is, however, a clear distinction between whole owners
and fractional owners that make this comparison incomplete for
safety regulations. Arguably, fractional owners are not similar to
whole owners of aircraft. Whole owners make a full investment
in their aircraft, handle all storage and maintenance of the air-
craft, and oversee all operational functions of staffing a crew,
keeping records, and avoiding liability. In the case of a frac-
tional owner, the managing company fulfills these necessary
functions, so that the fractional owner merely makes his pay-
ments and boards the plane. Based on the relationship between
the manager and owner in Netjets, and other similar programs,
the FAA's determination that Netjets is not engaged in commer-
cial carriage is fair. Some guidelines, however, should be in
place to mandate the operations of fractional ownership pro-
grams to ensure that the person with operational control has
knowledge of and responsibility for the airworthiness of the air-
craft. The proposed Subpart (k) will be a viable first step for
achieving this goal.
B. PROVIDE NOTICE TO PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
A significant problem that stems from the varied legal deci-
sions concerning fractional ownership programs is the lack of a
body of law from which program participants can make edu-
cated decisions about the risks and benefits of being involved in
such a program. Companies and their executives have several
choices when providing air travel for employees and clients.
Fractional ownership programs are a popular choice because
116 Gleimer, supra note 1, at 1003; see also Regulation, supra note 22, at 54,526
& 54,543-44.
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they offer the freedom of full ownership without the incredible
cost and responsibility. With the growing uncertainty in the law,
these programs become less appealing choices for cautious busi-
nesspeople. After much legal debate, program participants still
do not know where they fit in the body of aviation law. Courts
have been willing to betray the intentions of these participants
as outlined in the contract, and instead, hold that the program
managers are in operational control of the aircraft and there-
fore commercial carriers under the law. Because questions like
tort liability and securities regulation are still undecided by the
courts, managers and owners cannot predict the risks associated
with involvement in such a program. Courts have made it clear
that even explicit contractual statements will not be upheld
against a court's interpretation of statutes and legal precedent,
for it is not how these companies perceive themselves, but how
they conduct themselves, that is key.117 The erratic nature of the
courts in this regard could jeopardize the growth of a popular
branch of the business aviation industry. A uniform agreement
is necessary to provide notice to program participants of their
responsibilities under the law, to allow for businesses to make
educated decisions regarding involvement in these programs,
and to prompt Netjets and other similar organizations to struc-
ture their programs in compliance with the expectations pro-
vided by a clear and concise body of law.
C. PROTECT INDIVIDUALS
The decision in Thibodeaux shows how harmful the inconsis-
tencies in the law can be for the individuals involved in these
programs. The employees in Thibodeaux's company, EJI, chose
not to join a union like their sister company, EJA. As flight at-
tendants for a fractional ownership program, they had some rea-
son to expect that EJI, a service provider for individual aircraft
owners, not commercial entities, would be subject to the laws of
the FLSA. Contrary to their expectations, the court in Thibo-
deaux found that EJI was a "common carrier" and that Thibo-
deaux had no protection under the law. Although the facts of
the case do not describe the election not to participate in the
union, a valid argument exists that the employees would have
been more likely to unionize had they known they would not be
protected from unfair labor practices.
117 Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Int'l, 328 F.3d 742, 750 (5th Cir. 2003).
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The fractional owner in Fall Creek is another example of the
disadvantages individuals may have from the inconsistent law re-
garding these programs. In that case, the owner may have acted
differently had he known that he would be subject to federal
excise taxes through the management company and then be
forced to pay use taxes for his "personal property" in Missouri.
In the future, those involved in the business of fractional owner-
ship programs will be forced to make similar decisions about
their involvement in these programs. Owners should know if
they will be held liable for the acts of another fractional owner
in "their" aircraft; passengers should be able to fly confident
that the minimum safety requirements have been met by a
named responsible party; and all involved should have a stan-
dard by which to make decisions so that they can make essential
legal choices when participating in these programs.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although no body of law is complete and void of legal sur-
prises, one important decision may provide great clarity for the
fractional ownership market: is the fractional owner or program
manager in operational control of the aircraft? If the fractional
owner has control, the law should reflect the non-commercial
nature of the owner's relationship with the manager and other
fractional owners. In addition, safety regulations should be
adopted to ensure that each owner is aware of his responsibili-
ties in operating the aircraft, and the courts should be more
reluctant to place "common carrier" status on these sharing
agreements. If, however, the program manager is truly in con-
trol of the aircraft, the FAA should closely investigate whether
these companies are engaged in "transportation for hire." If so,
there is a strong argument that regulations closer to those de-
scribed in Part 135, designed to protect passive aircraft passen-
gers uninvolved in the operation of the aircraft, should be
required. Furthermore, the commercial nature of the business
warrants decisions supporting FLSA exemptions, the federal ex-
cise tax, and possible securities regulation. Most importantly, all
participants in the program-managers, owners, employees,
and affiliate companies-should have notice of their legal rights
and obligations under the law.
A. FRACTIONAL OWNERS IN OPERATIONAL CONTROL
Although convincing arguments could be made on both sides,
all participants in fractional ownership programs intend for the
20041
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
owner to be in operational control of the aircraft. The contract,
signed by business-minded individuals, explicitly outlines the
duties and responsibilities of each party, clearly stating that the
fractional owner is in operational control. By purchasing the air-
craft, the fractional owner knowingly subjects himself to risks as-
sociated with private ownership of the aircraft-namely,
depreciation of the property, applicable taxes and liability, at
least for his own negligence. The program manager, on the
other hand, simply acknowledges a duty to do just what his title
suggests-manage the fractional relationship among owners.
Like other management organizations, the Netjets program and
other similar companies provide all tangential services. These
duties include the enforcement of contract agreements, the
scheduling of flights and crew, and the maintenance of aircraft
and flight records to become compliant with aviation law.
B. THE LEGAL DILEMMA
These duties, however broad, should not change the initial
contractual relationship between the parties. The FAA's deter-
mination was clear in asserting that the owner retains opera-
tional control over the aircraft. It did not hesitate, however, to
note that fractional ownership programs are unique and may
not fit easily into pre-conceived categories of air service provid-
ers. They responded with legal ingenuity-if these programs are
different, we should treat them differently. Therefore, they cre-
ated provisions that were fair and rational in light of lengthy
investigations and input from various sources.
The courts, on the other hand, have not responded with the
same flexibility. They continue to measure the status of frac-
tional ownership programs by determining whether they are
commercial carriers or not. Unfortunately, fractional ownership
programs do not fit nicely into either category. Because com-
mercial and non-commercial entities share the roles and respon-
sibilities of safe and efficient air travel, cramming them into one
of these categories makes for an ill fit. To many courts reviewing
these cases, the business component of recruiting buyers over-
rides all other components of the relationship between the frac-
tional owners and its members. Arguably, the courts should
adopt a new approach to fractional ownership programs similar
to the one adopted by the FAA.
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C. THE SOLUTION-ENSURING OWNER CONTROL
Clearly, the question of who has operational control over the
aircraft is as important to recent legal decisions regarding frac-
tional ownership programs, which have held that these manag-
ers are commercial entities, as to the FAA safety regulations,
which overtly expressed its understanding that the non-commer-
cial entity is in operational control. To avoid antithetical deci-
sions regarding these programs in the future, measures should
be taken to ensure that the owner is truly in operational control
of the aircraft.
Subpart (k) has already taken steps in this direction. By re-
quiring owners to be "briefed" on their duties and responsibili-
ties and having them sign an acknowledgement upon entering
the contract, the FAA provisions will ensure that the owners are
aware of their responsibilities.1 ' Furthermore, the FAA has
given the fractional participants more ownership over the air-
craft. Although the program manager coordinates the flights,
hires the flight crew, and maintains the aircraft,"' the FAA pro-
poses that the owner should have the authority to check flight
records and logs and override any assignment of a crew to a par-
ticular flight.12° Fractional owners may have been slow to take
such action in the past; however, an awareness of their responsi-
bilities and potential liability may spurn more active participa-
tion on the part of the owners.
Most importantly, a clear definition for fractional ownership
programs should be outlined, and this definition should perme-
ate all legal decisions concerning these programs. Again, the
FAA proposal attempts to define specific programs that will be
subject to Subpart (k). 12' Netjets and other similar programs
may attempt to alter their program to more closely resemble
wholly owned private aircraft, subject to Part 91 regulations.
118 Regulation, supra note 22, at 54,525. Enforcement of this provision is still
being investigated by the implementation team.
119 14 C.F.R § 91.1001. Subsection (8) defines the administrative functions of
fractional ownership management as: (i) establishment and implementation of
program safety guidelines; (ii) employment, furnishing or contracting of pilots
and other crewmembers; (iii) training and qualification of pilots and other
crewmembers and personnel; (iv) scheduling and coordination of the program
aircraft and crews; (v) maintenance of program aircraft; (vi) satisfaction of re-
cordkeeping requirements; (vii) development and use of a program operations
manual and procedures; and (viii) application for and maintenance of manage-
ment specifications and other authorizations and approvals.
120 Regulation, supra note 22, at 54,531.
121 14 C.F.R. § 91.1001.
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Clear guidelines must delineate these fractional ownership pro-
gram mangers from other managing agents. By looking at the
nature of the fractional ownership business, Netjets and other
program managers initially own the aircraft and then sell frac-
tions of the craft to other owners. This is different from a man-
aging agent, who may market to owners, but is not involved in
initial procurement of the craft. This distinction is important as
it goes to the heart of who is in operational control. Because of
the ease with which Netjets provides its service, so that a frac-
tional owner only has to sign a pre-printed contractual agree-
ment and make appointments to use the aircraft, it has become
a successful branch of private aircraft ownership. If these com-
panies attempt to lose this control both before and after pro-
curement of the craft by the owner, they are likely to find that
the service they provide is not only just like that of a managing
agent, but also more of a burden than benefit to its customers.
In addition, specific regulations must be in place to ensure
that any program manager exhibiting more control than al-
lowed by the FAA will be considered Part 135 "commercial carri-
ers." If a company is really acting as a charter service, with only
private owners as a proxy for operation, clearly these programs
should be treated as such. This can be monitored by auditing
both the contract agreements and working relationship of the
manager and owners in these programs. Once the 'fractional
ownership program' is clearly defined as those operations run
like the Netjets program, and narrow definitions are put into
place to ensure that fractional ownership programs must oper-
ate under Subpart (k), the FAA and courts can act with knowl-
edge and confidence in making legal decisions concerning
these programs.
1. Unification in Legal Disputes
a. Tax Decisions
As discussed above, these decisions rest on 1) who is in "pos-
session, command and control" of the aircraft and 2) whether
the program manager is "in the business of transporting for
hire." Therefore, again the ultimate question to be determined
is who is in operational control of the aircraft. With the new
finding by the FAA, and the pursuant regulations to ensure that
the fractional owner really is in control of the use of the aircraft,
a stronger argument lies on the side of determining that these
flights are not commercial. If a fractional ownership program
falls within the strict parameters of Subpart (k), the IRS and cir-
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cuit courts should apply non-commercial taxes accordingly, not
the federal excise tax. In this case, the fractional owners would
be forced to pay taxes; however, they would also be allowed to
deduct depreciation of the aircraft from their income tax. In
addition, state use and sales taxes could apply to the fractional
purchase of interest in the aircraft according to standard taxes
for private aircraft owners.
b. FLSA
Furthermore, if the fractional ownership program falls within
the purview of the FAA's definition, these programs should not
be exempt under the FLSA. Although the program manager
markets its services, the fractional owner is in operational con-
trol of the aircraft, and under the new guidelines, may have the
final say over use of the crew and flight duties. 122 As a passenger
on his own plane, the owner should not receive the same protec-
tion afforded the passengers on commercial flights at the ex-
pense of the employee. Clearly, applying the FLSA exemption
to these programs does not further the objectives of Title II of
the RLA. The need to keep "transportation moving" in frac-
tional ownership programs is an internal, private need rather
than a public concern warranting legal remedy. Instead of ap-
plying the exemption, which allows fractional owners to be non-
participants in the treatment of employees servicing their own
flights, these programs should be subject to the FLSA provisions.
If costs are incurred due to required overtime pay, fractional
owners may be encouraged to take a more active role in regulat-
ing the crew's time and duties during the flights.
c. Future Legal Decisions
In addition to removing the inconsistencies already present in
the law concerning these programs, setting clear standards that
ensure fractional owners are in operational control of the air-
craft is important in providing notice for future decisions. First,
owners that are in operational control of the aircraft will be lia-
ble for accidents that arise from use of this aircraft. Knowing
this outcome, these owners can take steps to regulate their liabil-
ity for losses that another fractional owner may have caused. By
recognizing the risks associated with fractional ownership pro-
grams, businesses can work to change contract agreements with
122 New regulations in Subpart (k), which limit the use of the crew and require
rest times, may also affect overtime compensation within these programs. Id.
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other fractional owners to protect their assets and take a more
active role in the operation of the aircraft to ensure the least
chance of liability.
Furthermore, a decision that is clear in granting fractional
owners operational control over the aircraft in which they own
an interest is important to alleviating concerns that these pro-
grams may be subject to securities regulation in the future. If
the owners are in control of the aircraft, there will be no ratio-
nale for application of securities regulation. Although a pro-
gram manager provides services for the owners' aircraft, true
ownership is in the hands of the fractional owner whose interest
in the aircraft is solely for transportation of employees and/or
clients. Therefore, the third prong of the Howey Test, which
requires the aircraft to be used in the expectation of profits,
would not be met.
2. Furtherance of Public Policy
A decision holding program managers in operational control
of the aircraft would have negative consequences on the busi-
ness and aviation community: 1) fractional ownership programs
would become charter organizations under the law, depriving
both owners and program managers of the benefits of the
unique nature of these programs, and 2) fractional owners
would have permission to take a passive role in ensuring the air-
worthiness of the aircraft in which they own an interest, leaving
the responsibility to program managers alone. To the contrary,
a concise definition regulating the operation of fractional own-
ership programs, which places operational control in the hands
of the fractional owner, and requiring the fractional owner to
take on the risks and liabilities associated with aircraft owner-
ship, would further important public policy. Uniform mandates
in the law that recognize the non-commercial nature of these
programs and shared responsibilities by both owners and man-
agers will work to increase public safety, give notice to program
participants, and protect individuals affiliated with Netjets and
similar programs.
By adopting the provisions of Subpart (k), the FAA has taken
large steps in ensuring safer travel. Because air travel requires
heightened safety requirements, the FAA should provide a
mechanism for holding owners and program managers respon-
sible for maintaining compliance, which would ensure safer air
travel. In addition, if fractional owners are held in operational
control of the aircraft, they would have both the power and duty
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to take an active role in the maintenance of the craft and selec-
tion of the crew. This allows fractional ownership programs to
safely retain their unique status in the body of air service provid-
ers, having more control than charter services without the im-
mense work associated with wholly-owned aircraft. At first,
program participants may be hesitant to change their existing
program; however, requiring the owners to become more en-
gaged in the program's operations and bear more responsibility
will make large strides in ensuring safer air travel.
If the laws are harmonized, so that fractional ownership pro-
grams are treated similarly by every law-making body, then pro-
gram participants and affiliated individuals will receive the legal
protection that has been deemed paramount by American
courts. By holding the fractional owner in operational control
of the aircraft, all program participants will be aware of their
responsibilities and risk of liability before engaging in the frac-
tional ownership program. Business decisions, contract agree-
ments and negotiations can be made with the knowledge of
potential legal outcomes. In addition, employees and other affil-
iated services can make decisions to protect their legal inter-
ests-whether it is to join a union, apply for overtime wages, or
agree to go on strike.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the outcome, a legal determination regarding
these programs must be made. If it is determined that the pro-
gram manager is truly in operational control of the aircraft, the
law would essentially eliminate the fractional ownership business
and essentially hold all similar entities as charter services under
the law. If the legal community can adopt fair laws that further
the purpose of mandates and regulations, while honoring the
intent of the contracting parties, it should make every attempt
to do so.
In the case of fractional ownership programs, the laws have
been erratic and the decisions conflicting. All findings, how-
ever, rest on the answer to the same question-determining
who is in operational control of the aircraft. If other administra-
tive bodies and legal courts would be willing to adopt the find-
ings of the FAA, the law would become more harmonized, legal
precedent would be consistent and instructive, and important
public policy would be furthered. If operational control is in the
hands of the fractional owner, and the flights are therefore non-
commercial in nature, the unique nature of these programs
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would be recognized and the intent of the program participants
would be met.
Although it may seem that placing liability in the hands of a
distant, fractional owner would decrease the level of safe travel
in these programs, this decision would likely have the opposite
effect. In practice, fractional owners would become more in-
volved in the process, and program mangers would have the ex-
tra incentive to maintain safety compliance as a means of
customer satisfaction for a more interested consumer base. Be-
cause Subpart (k) clearly defines the fractional ownership pro-
gram, preventing companies with more control from operating
under the less stringent standards of Part 91, this decision would
allow fractional ownership programs to survive and yet meet
necessary trade standards for safety.
This finding would have a positive impact on other conflicts
in the law. Fractional owners would be responsible for paying
taxes on their fractional interest but would enjoy the tax deduc-
tions for the aircraft's use each year. Because employee com-
plaints would essentially have no effect on the public market,
holding these programs to the FLSA overtime provisions is ap-
propriate under the provisions of the statute and provides a le-
gal remedy for employees unable to protect themselves.
Although fractional owners may object to liability for accidents
caused by their aircraft, a decision in the law provides important
notice allowing these owners to make contractual arrangements
protective of each owner's individual rights.
Just like the introduction of any new business enterprise, frac-
tional ownership programs have faced the confusion that belies
our legal system-finding its place and forging a way within ex-
isting aviation law. Although the merits of American law should
not be undermined, it is time for the law to decide where frac-
tional ownership programs stand in the aviation community.
Without a standard, judicial and administrative decisions will
continue to confuse program participants. No longer can im-
portant issues be lost between owners and program managers.
Operational control is best served if placed with the fractional
owner, requiring both parties to seek safe travel and fair opera-
tions of the aircraft to ensure the continued success of this im-
portant part of the aviation industry.
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